Can a company examine a suspect employee's laptop before calling the police?
In January 2026 The Korea Times reported that police in Seoul were investigating, among other matters, the e-commerce company Coupang analysing a laptop belonging to a data breach suspect “without consulting relevant government authorities”. When a company examines a suspect’s device itself, it can find that the way it handled the evidence becomes a question in its own right.
Sometimes, for company devices, but how it does so matters, and it is often better not to. Opening files, logging in or running tools on a laptop changes it, and an examination done in-house, without a documented forensic copy, can be challenged later and may be seen as interfering with evidence the police or a regulator would have wanted untouched. A safer order is: secure the device as it is, record who has handled it, take legal advice on whether to report to the police or a regulator first, and have an independent examiner make a verified forensic copy before anyone looks inside. Personal devices are different: examining them needs the owner’s consent or a court order.
What was reported
The Korea Times reported on 30 January 2026 that the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency was investigating, among other matters, the company analysing a breach suspect’s laptop “without consulting relevant government authorities”. Coupang had said that “the data of only 3,000 customers had been leaked”; the Science Ministry called that “the company’s unilateral claim”, and the paper said the breach allegedly affected more than 33 million customers. Coupang said it had “fully” cooperated with the government investigations.
The report did not say whether the laptop belonged to the company or the individual, or how the company came to hold it, and nothing here suggests how it was handled. No one named in the report had been charged. We draw no conclusions about Coupang, its staff or the suspect. The legal position differs between jurisdictions; the guidance below is general and Hong Kong-focused.
Why examining it yourself is risky
- Change. Switching a laptop on, opening files or plugging in tools alters dates, logs and other traces.
- Gaps in the record. Without a documented chain of custody, it is hard to show later what was there before you started.
- Independence. Any organisation examining evidence about its own incident may be asked to show the work was independent.
- Overlap with the authorities. Police or regulators may want the device untouched, and acting first can complicate their work.
- Findings that do not hold. Conclusions drawn from an unrecorded examination can be hard to defend if they are later questioned.
A safer order of steps
Secure the company device as it is: if it is on, leave it on and plugged in, do not close the lid, and ask an examiner how to take it off the network; if it is off, leave it off. Record who has handled it and when, and keep any disk-encryption recovery keys the company holds. Preserve related server, email and access logs before they are overwritten. Any later examination must follow your IT and monitoring policies and the PDPO, and should be done on the forensic copy, not the laptop itself. Take legal advice early on reporting to the police or a regulator, and on what can be examined before you do. Then have an independent examiner make a verified forensic copy, so that any examination works on the copy and the original stays as it was. Do not log in to the employee’s personal accounts, even if they are signed in on the device.
As at November 2026 there is no general legal duty under the PDPO to notify the PCPD of a data breach, although the PCPD encourages notification. Under Cap. 653, only designated critical infrastructure operators (designated organisations are notified in writing; the list is not published) must report computer security incidents affecting their critical computer systems: within 12 hours of becoming aware of a serious incident, and within 48 hours of becoming aware of any other incident. Other laws may apply. Take advice.
See proving an employee took files on a work laptop and computer forensics.
Sources
General commentary on public reports, not legal advice and not a finding about any organisation or person named in those reports. Facts are as reported at the time of writing.
Frequently asked questions
Can a company examine a suspect employee's laptop before calling the police?
Sometimes, for company devices, but it is often better to secure the device, take legal advice on reporting first, and have an independent examiner make a verified forensic copy before anyone looks inside. Personal devices need the owner's consent or a court order.
Why not just look at the files ourselves?
Opening files or running tools changes the device, and without a documented forensic copy it is hard to show later what was there. An in-house look can also be seen as interfering with evidence.
What is a forensic copy?
A complete copy of a device's storage, made with tools that do not change the original and checked with a digital fingerprint (hash), so the examination can be done on the copy.
Should we switch the laptop off?
No. If it is on, leave it on and plugged in, and do not close the lid; switching off can lose information held in memory and may lock an encrypted disk. If it is off, leave it off. Ask an examiner how to take it off the network.
Can we examine an employee's personal phone or laptop?
Not without the owner's consent or a court order. Preserve company devices and systems, and take legal advice about personal devices.
Facing something like this?
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