Insights · Insider investigations

How can a company prove an employee took confidential files on a work laptop?

In May 2026 prosecutors in Taipei indicted a former employee of a semiconductor company, accusing him of using a company laptop to access a client order system without authorisation and of taking orders, forecasts, client lists and recordings of internal briefings, which they said he used in paid seminars. Whatever the outcome of that case, it raises a question many employers ask: what can a work laptop actually show?

In short

By preserving the laptop properly and quickly, then examining it forensically. A forensic image of a work laptop can often show, as far as the system recorded it, which files were opened, renamed or deleted and when, and sometimes which were copied, which USB drives were connected, which cloud storage, email or messaging services were used to move data, which screenshots or screen recordings were made on it, and which internal systems were accessed. Server and system logs, where they are kept, can corroborate this. Material found outside the company, such as slides used elsewhere, can sometimes be matched to internal documents by content and metadata. The evidence shows what a device and account did; who was using them usually needs other evidence too. Preserve first, keep the device switched on or off as it is, do not log in to the employee’s personal accounts, and take legal advice before confronting anyone.

What was reported

Focus Taiwan reported on 25 May 2026 that the Taipei District Prosecutors Office had indicted a former employee of Avago Technologies Taiwan under the Trade Secrets Act and related offences. Prosecutors alleged that he “used a company-issued laptop to access Avago’s client order analysis system, without authorization”, took customer orders, forecasts, product schedules and client lists, and used screenshots and recordings to copy material from internal quarterly briefings. They alleged he used the material in paid seminars. The report said the case began with an internal whistleblower.

These are allegations; he had not been tried when the report was published. We do not name him and draw no conclusions about him. The report did not describe the investigative methods used.

What a work laptop can show

  • File activity. Which documents were opened, copied, renamed or deleted, and when, as far as the operating system recorded it.
  • Removable media. Which USB drives or other devices were connected, and when.
  • Cloud and messaging. Use of personal cloud storage, webmail or messaging apps to move files.
  • Screen capture. Screenshots and screen recordings, and the tools used to make them.
  • System access. Browser history and cached data showing visits to internal systems, matched against those systems’ own logs where they are kept.

Material found outside the company, such as a slide deck or recording, can sometimes be matched to an internal original by its content, layout, embedded metadata or file history. Each finding needs to be documented so that another examiner could repeat it.

If you suspect an insider

Keep it to a very small group. Do not let IT staff browse the laptop or reissue it to someone else, and do not confront the employee before evidence is preserved, because that is when files tend to disappear. Do not log in to the employee’s personal email, cloud or messaging accounts, even if the laptop is still signed in; that usually needs consent or a court order. Arrange a forensic image of the company device and preservation of relevant company email, cloud and system logs, which may be overwritten on a schedule. Take legal advice early on employment, privacy and court options, and on whether to report to the police.

See computer forensics and cyber investigations.

Sources

General commentary on public reports, not legal advice and not a finding about any organisation or person named in those reports. Facts are as reported at the time of writing.

Frequently asked questions

How can a company prove an employee took confidential files on a work laptop?

By preserving the company laptop with a forensic image and examining file activity, as far as the system recorded it, USB connections, cloud and messaging use, screenshots and access to internal systems, then corroborating with server logs. The evidence shows what the device and account did; who was using them usually needs other evidence too.

Can deleted files on a work laptop be recovered?

Sometimes. It depends on the type of storage, encryption and how much the device has been used since. Records that a file existed or was copied often survive even when the file itself does not.

Should IT staff look through the laptop first?

No. Browsing or reissuing the device can change or overwrite evidence. Secure it as it is, switched on or off, and arrange a forensic image first.

Can screenshots and screen recordings be traced?

Sometimes. Screenshots and recordings made on the laptop can leave files and usage records, and captured images can sometimes be matched to the original material. A photo taken with a separate phone leaves nothing on the laptop.

Should we confront the employee straight away?

Not before evidence is preserved and you have taken legal advice. A confrontation is often the moment files and messages are deleted.

Facing something like this?

The first discussion is confidential and free, and usually changes what you decide to do next. Call +852 5808 1071 or use the case review form.